American Foreign Policy towards Nuclear Disarmament, 1945-1999

By Taylor C. Parkin

The dawning of the age of nuclear weapons brought major new types of reliance systems for national security, and also put humanity’s survival at risk. This essay examines the evolution of U.S. policy toward testing of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, during the Cold War and in the years since it ended. It discusses major treaties and other agreements intended to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons among nations, to restrict testing, and to bring actual reductions of nuclear stockpiles. It explores strategic choices and the complex, often competing considerations involved.

INTRODUCTION

The international theater is one of great turmoil, frequent conflict, and eventually the compromise or the demise of civilization. The nuclear age ushered in the first possible option for absolute extinction of humanity, the nuclear warhead. The past fifty years have seen the fruits of that invention’s labor. The nuclear warhead has become not only the premier armament of the 20th century, but also the guarantor of the international system. This essay outlines United States foreign policy towards nuclear weapons and their disarmament. This paper constitutes an effort to recap the past stages and fluctuations of the U.S. foreign policy position and explores the future options America has for the upcoming millennium. Will the world decrease its nuclear capacity? The answer has appeared to be yes, but is that really what is happening? What are the up-and-coming goals of the United States on this subject and what strategies for disarmament will it pursue?

First, this essay discusses the coming of the nuclear age with the detonation of the first atomic bomb by the United States. It reviews the germane treaties, bilateral, unilateral, and multilateral. Therein it discusses the different policy changes the United States made in order to enter into these treaties, and examines reasons why United States policy became the stockpiling of nuclear weapons for security.

Following a focus on Cold War disarmament the essay then discusses the pertinent disarmament treaties and agreements that began the actual depletion of nuclear weapons. These agreements began the disarmament process as we view it today. Should the United States disarm at a more rapid rate than its adversaries? Will this place it in a vulnerable position from a national security standpoint? Or because it is the only superpower left should it initiate these reforms? All of these questions are important ones that the United States has attempted to answer in the past decade. These answers though expensive and security threatening are the foundation upon which the upcoming foreign policy on disarmament will be based. This foundation set the stage for United States foreign policy in two key scenarios: (1) the Iraqi nuclear situation, and (2) the nuclear detonations in both Pakistan and India. Both of these scenarios are good examples of the United States’ current position on nuclear weapons in both direct conflicts (the United States and NATO are directly involved in Iraq), and also indirect conflicts (the United States is economically affected by the nuclear situation in southeast Asia due to the possibility of regional conflict).

These are not the only reasons that the United States has an interest in these areas. The world’s stabilization is in jeopardy if other nations are engaged in constructing nuclear weapons while those who already possess them are trying to dismantle them. It is a cycle of the possibility of mass destruction that must be contained, and it is the United States’ current goal to stop that cycle.

Finally, this essay discusses the various options and strategies the United States has at its disposal, to deal with both up-and-coming nations that want to become nuclear states—as defined by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—as well as the eventual complete nuclear disarmament of the current nuclear states. All of these strategies involve predications based upon precedents and the United States’ representative policy positions.
The author began to research the topic of nuclear disarmament as a high school student representing China in a Model United Nations competition in New York City, on the topics of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear Armament Registry. This conference sparked my interest in international politics, specifically disarmament. In the next two years I dealt with various disarmament questions, and then went on to direct and chair a Model United Nations Conference, always in committees that dealt with the disarmament question. Service in the White House as an intern from January to March 1998, in the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, enabled me to learn more of the full spectrum of the foreign policy model. While there I researched not only how the United States determined foreign policy, but also much about how other nations did as well. In turn, my interest in nuclear disarmament continued to grow. Research in Model United Nations, in Washington, DC and at the United Nations Document Depository at the Marriot Library, University of Utah, is reflected here.

HISTORICAL UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS DISARMAMENT

In 1945, at the end of the war of horrors, the world was confronted by yet another horror, that of massive explosive power, instantaneous devastation and unforeseeable long-term effects of atomic weapons; the proverbial sword of Damocles was hung over the fate of humanity. The beginning of the nuclear age placed the entire world, not just part of it, in a dilemma, the political, social, economic and environmental consequences of which we are still bearing today. It created a moral quandary for the whole Earth’s population, and placed a heavy responsibility on those nations that became dependent on nuclear weapons for their security (United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs (UNCDA) 1995c, 1).

The American foreign policy schematic with regards to nuclear weapons is a complex one. Since the detonation of the first nuclear weapon, the world has been the product of nuclear weapon diplomacy (Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, 66). The Cold War era defined itself by categorizing all states according to their nuclear station in the global theater (Rhinelander 1995, xi). This definition helped identify which states were powerful, were major players, and had to be negotiated with in order to create resolution of conflict. Until the close of the Cold War period disarmament negotiations were limited. It is now, within the context of the post-Cold War era—after the break-up of the bipolar geopolitical system—that true nuclear disarmament can be pursued as a viable foreign policy option. However, even in a multi-polar world disarmament is still a tedious process. The history of nuclear weapons treaties and agreements during the Cold War set the foundation for today’s disarmament.

Nuclear disarmament has historically been a priority in the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and accordingly the United States has promoted treaties limiting nuclear proliferation and those aiming toward eventual nuclear disarmament. On 5 August 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, also known as the partial test-ban treaty which banned all testing except for underground testing, was signed (United Nations 1992a, 22). The United States was one of the three nuclear powers designated as depositories for the treaty. The treaty entered into force on 10 October of that year and as of 17 January 1995, had 172 parties. This treaty was drafted in order to limit the amount of testing that would adversely affect the environment and its population. It also set the groundwork for further treaties that would eventually culminate in the proposed institution of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (UNCDA 1995a, 5). This treaty was one in the long list of U.S. purported disarmament negotiations.

The next treaty of importance to U.S. policy on nuclear disarmament was the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (also commonly known as the outer-space treaty). This treaty was signed on 27 January, 1967 and ratified by the United States Senate 10 October, 1967. It limited all nations from placing any “object carrying nuclear weapons. . . in orbit around the Earth, or stationing them in outer space or on bases, or the testing of any kind of weapon on celestial bodies” (United Nations 1988i, 4). This treaty was the next step in confining the use of nuclear weapons and their development to earth. It also helped to bring the United States and the USSR to the table to begin discussions of limiting nuclear weapons. This treaty was soon followed by the 1968 treaty on non-proliferation.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the first major step towards non-proliferation and eventual disarmament. Its main goals included: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, promoting the process of nuclear disarmament, and facilitating access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (United Nations 1988i, 4). When the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States and the Soviet Union had a significant nuclear stockpile. Between them they had deployed 7,500 nuclear weapons on long range missiles and bombers, and another 32,000 weapons on short range offensive systems. The three remaining nuclear states (China, France, and the United Kingdom) had a cumulative 400 nuclear warheads. Due to this disproportionate amount of nuclear power it became the responsibility of the U.S. and the USSR to pave the way for disarmament negotiations. According to Article Six of the treaty the committed nuclear powers, U.S., USSR, and UK, must pursue, “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of [the] nuclear arms race” (Harrison 1995, 5). However, since the initiation of the treaty the number of nuclear weapons has increased dramatically (Rhinelander 1995, xiii). In addition to the provisions for nations decreasing their nuclear armaments, the treaty’s introduction stated that the “parties would seek to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear testing,” in
keeping with the agreements made in the partial test-ban treaty (United Nations 1988h, 5). Since the treaty's entry into force over 138 parties have become signatories. Along with nations becoming party to the treaty, four review conferences have been held. At each of these the United States has continued to reaffirm the goals of the treaty as well as reaffirm its leadership in the world.

Shortly following the implementation of the NPT, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof, commonly known as the sea-bed treaty, was drafted and signed (United Nations 1988i, 7). It entered into force in 1972 and since has received over 82 countries as signatories. The United States has led two review conferences on the treaty, both reaffirming the mission and goals of the treaty's principles (United Nations 1988c, 7). This treaty limited testing to underground only, and in doing so brought the world one step closer to a comprehensive test ban treaty. This treaty was also the final multilateral treaty passed during the Cold War. All other treaties were either bilateral or regional in nature.

The United States began its bilateral communication with the USSR in 1963 with the inception of the Memorandum of Understanding. It created for use “in times of emergency,” a direct communications link between Washington, DC and Moscow, known as the “hot-line” in order to ensure the safety of the populations in case of a false alarm (United Nations 1988e, 15). The creation of the “hot-line” was viewed by many as the first major step toward United States and Soviet cooperative relations in the nuclear era. Since the hot-line was established two additions have been made. First, in 1971 the Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communication Link was adopted. It allowed for communication via satellite in order to quicken the response time of the leaders of the two nations. Secondly, in 1984 the hot-line was upgraded to include a facsimile line in order to facilitate the transmission of not only text, but maps and graphs as well (United Nations 1988a, 15).

In 1968 the first stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) began. As a result of the first three years of discussion the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) was ratified in 1972. The treaty limited the amount of land-based launch sites to two per country with no more than 100 warheads per site (United Nations 1988f, 17). This agreement was a landmark step in foreign policy negotiation, because it inherently considered that both countries had reached a point of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and as such each understood that they must limit the amount of warheads targeted at each other in order to guarantee stability. The interim stage of SALT I created the Interim Agreement which limited the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This in turn, would extend the provisions of SALT I, and eliminate the need for shorter-range missiles (United Nations 1988a, 18). The final agreement in the SALT I treaty period was the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed in 1973. It extended the treaty to refrain from the “threat or use of force not only against each other, but also against the allies of the other party. . . in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security” (United Nations 1988b, 18). The extension of this idea was important because it reduced the risk of a proactive nuclear strike to a bare minimum.

The next step taken by the United States to facilitate nuclear disarmament was the initiation of the steps outlined in the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, commonly known as the threshold test-ban treaty. This treaty was signed 3 July 1974. It limited nuclear testing to less than 150 kilotons (United Nations 1988g, 19). This was an important step because blasts of under 150 kilotons are extremely hard to engineer unless larger blasts have been detonated before. Also, blasts of this size are often used for peaceful purposes only, i.e. mining and nuclear reactors for electric power. This limit also made it much easier to verify nuclear testing over the 150 kiloton limit, which in turn made it virtually impossible for a non-nuclear state to become nuclear without another state noticing.

At the close of SALT I, SALT II was instigated. In 1979 the talks produced the Treaty on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This treaty set a ceiling on the amount of strategic delivery devices each nation could possess at 2,400 (United Nations 1988k, 22). It also sets limits on the amount of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) each missile could have. This added to the equality of the two nations and thus, the continuance of balance of power stability. Though both nations have striven to keep the conditions of this treaty it has still not been ratified by the United States Senate.

The final treaty negotiated under the auspices of the Cold War was the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly known as the INF treaty. This treaty eliminates all nuclear weapons that are not either ICBMs or Short Range missiles (missiles termed as “Short Range” are only accurate when fired from less than 500 kilometers away). It also calls for a triad verification process which is comprised of: (1) on-site inspections; (2) inspection by challenge (i.e. if a signatory country had reason to believe that another signatory nation was breaking the treaty, it would challenge that country and conduct an on-site inspection); and (3) national technical means such as satellite (United Nations 1988k, 22). This type of verification system has been termed C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence). This form is used especially by the United States in order to detect false alarms, first strikes, and other nuclear phenomena (United Nations 1992b, 10). It also functions as the fastest means of communication between nuclear states in order to ensure that a false alarm will not instigate nuclear war. The compromise on these forms of verification helps to illustrate
the new amount of trust built between the two nations. These and other confidence-building measures have become the cornerstone for all disarmament negotiations.

**United States Foreign Policy on Disarmament in the Post Cold-War World**

With the end of the Cold War [the danger from nuclear weapons] has greatly diminished. We have now begun the process of reducing nuclear arsenals. But the potential danger has not been eliminated. For this the elimination of all nuclear weapons will be necessary as a first step. A nuclear-weapon-free world is an essential step towards the creation of a society in which the human species is no longer endangered, and this will mean no less then the creation of a war-free world (Rotblat 1996, 1).

At the close of the Cold War the United States met a new nuclear challenge: disarmament in the post Cold-War world. Now that the multi-polar world had been created with the crumbling of the Soviet Empire, multiple new questions regarding the validity and certainty of prior treaties and negotiations were under inquisition. Which treaties would hold true? Was disarmament still valid? What defined a powerful state under the multi-polar system? A new quest existed for American foreign policy and that would be framed by an, “evaluation of the success of past non-proliferation efforts, the current incentives and constraints to proliferation, and whether or not the international community regards the spread of nuclear weapons on the eve of the twenty-first century as largely inevitable or manageable” (Foran 1996, 175). In all of these cases the United States would play a leading role, as the only existing super power, in answering these questions.

The first defining chapter on the future of nuclear disarmament was built into the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START). This treaty was developed over two years and signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991. It was the largest one-step reduction taken so far by the United States and Russia in their attempts to disarm. It provided for a reduction within seven years of ICBMs as well as SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) to a minimum ten percent overall reduction of armaments (Conference on Disarmament 1991, 1). It also built upon prior commitments made in the NPT, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty, and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990. In accordance with these treaties the two parties would strive to “reduce and limit [their] strategic and offensive arms,” as well as strive to, “reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security” (Conference on Disarmament 1991, 1). By becoming party to this treaty the United States set a precedent for the eventual elimination of armaments. Its role as a leader and promoter of disarmament had become solidified by its own promise to disarm. Its main goal now was to follow through with its own disarmament and verify that Russia was doing the same.

Under the requirements of START in 1991 the United States began dismantling its nuclear arsenal. On 27 September 1991 it stopped development of mobile ICBMs and removed from alert posture all remaining ICBMs (UNODA 1992b, 5). This was important because it placed the United States ahead of its scheduled disarmament. It continued to forge ahead by canceling the development of any new ICBMs and dismantling fifty larger ICBMs. This was a significant reduction because it was no longer just halting the development and assembly of weapons, but rather furthering complete destruction of armaments. As the year progressed, the United States also removed most of its nuclear Tomahawk missiles from submarines. In order to keep pace with the United States, Russia began its own dismantling in response. The bilateral negotiations worked in order to take many active ICBMs off alert on both sides. “President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia’s commitment as the successor state to the USSR, to fulfill ‘all its obligations under bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements in force and signed on the subject of arms limitation and disarmament’” (UNODA 1992a, 3).

Following the signing of START the United States along with over one hundred other countries began to press for the extension of the non-proliferation treaty. The NPT was viewed as the next most comprehensive step towards disarmament, along with a comprehensive test ban treaty. The NPT, though not signed by all countries, remains the most widely supported, multilateral arms control treaty (Foran 1996, 186). It is also complemented by Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) which in many cases overlap the countries that have yet to sign the NPT, effectively including them in the treaty. NWFZs are geographically isolated areas where no nuclear weapons can be housed or deployed. In order for a NWFZ to exist all nations in the area must agree, as well as all nuclear states, to maintain a nuclear-free area.

After the creation of many NWFZs the United States headed a meeting of the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council in Washington on 20-21 February, 1992. This meeting accomplished many goals among the permanent five including: (1) deciding which weapons systems the countries would notify each other about; (2) determining when in the arms transfer process notification should take place; (3) implementing an agreement to share information on arms transfers that occurred in 1991; and (4) working on guidelines for weapons of mass destruction (UNODA 1993a, 62-63). Though these things were accomplished many questions remained. The United States was still pushing for a registry of armaments; however, China as well as a few others remained uncooperative. In China’s case there were at least two reasons: (1) The United States was selling F-16 military aircraft to Taiwan in 1991; and (2) China valued its sovereignty highly and viewed the registry as a breach of that sovereignty. The conventional arms transfer gave China a pretext in which to withdraw from the talks.
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency developed United States, "would pursue new steps to control the mate-
rials nuclear superiority and its disarmament agenda. In doing so the United States furthered both support to Belarus as it moved forward toward declared non-
 democratic world. "President Clinton stressed his 'commitment to democracy and regional stability,' and 'applauded Belarus for its removal of tactical nuclear weapons'" (Conference on Disarmament 1993c, 3). The United States continued its firm the policy objectives of the United States with regard to START.
The next major foreign policy objective for the United States was ensuring the successful extension of the NPT. The extension of the NPT was seen as "a necessary step towards the disarmament process," for the United States as well as a multitude of other nations (UNCDA 1995b, 5). The extension Conference held on 11 May 1995 produced three separate resolutions to coincide with the indefinite extension of the NPT. They included a resolution that required a stronger review and evaluation process with a specific time frame for the treaty, a NWFZ in the area of the Middle East, and the
acquisition of Israel to the NPT. The United States was disappointed at the singling-out of Israel and as such pressed for the Middle East-wide NWFZ. In the end the treaty was extended and all three resolutions were adopted as a package. Holistically, the NPT compromise package, “addressed many of the states’ concerns, in particular the enhanced review process and principles and objectives for disarmament” (Foran 1996, 194). Following the extension of the NPT the United States continued to work with the world community in order to reduce nuclear weapons.

Early in 1995, the United States voted for United Nations Resolution A/49/699, which proposed a “step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat” (General Assembly 1994, 35). In accordance with U.S. policy the resolution “desired to reduce, progressively and systematically, the threat posed by nuclear weapons.” It also sought, in the active clauses of the resolution: to get countries to “cease the production of all fissionable materials; cease the manufacture and testing of nuclear warheads; and prohibit the test explosion of nuclear weapons” (General Assembly 1994, 36-37). The resolution was passed with strong U.S. support and included a reaffirmation of the United States’ favorable current policy towards bilateral agreements.

The next stage of United States foreign policy towards disarmament was manifested in START II. “The principal U.S. objective in strategic arms control is to increase stability at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons” (Conference on Disarmament 1996a, 2). In START II the United States and Russia agreed to reduce nuclear forces by an additional 5,000 warheads, beyond the 9,000 warheads being reduced under START I. In addition to President Clinton signing the treaty, the Senate ratified the START II on 26 January 1998. “President Clinton congratulated the bipartisan efforts that had, ‘seized the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to take a big step back from the nuclear precipice’” (Conference on Disarmament 1996b, 3). Upon the ratification START III discussions began. START II represents the most comprehensive nuclear disarmament proposal written as of yet. The United States viewed this proposal as a benchmark in the disarmament process.

**FOREIGN POLICY SCENARIO I: IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

The major U.S. nuclear weapons related concern is obvious and overwhelming, we must do whatever is in our power to improve physical control and security of [Iraqi] nuclear weapons. . . . Even if all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction eventually are accounted for, and inspections end, we must maintain long-term monitoring of nuclear related technologies thereafter (O’Hanlon 1999a, 25).

The first foreign policy initiative of precedence for United States foreign policy on disarmament to examine is the dismantlement of the Iraqi nuclear program. Halting the development of nuclear arms by Iraq was of paramount importance to United States security. Any time a non-nuclear state, which is not party to any existing proliferation or disarmament treaties, begins to amass nuclear weapons the United States must evaluate its relative threat. In turn this deterrence only exists if all states are aware of the potential military damage that can be caused by the existence of nuclear weapons. When such a weapon is held outside of the current international theater instability will result. The United States aims to solidify stability, and its place as a global leader in the world, while dismantling its nuclear arsenal at a speed in keeping with these goals. In turn the existence of nuclear weapons in Iraq changes this foreign policy scenario and requires action and intervention. Moreover, until the United Nations has deemed that Iraq’s weapons have been dismantled, a more protective security policy should always be pursued.

According to the United Nations Special Commission on the destruction of Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons, many Iraqi nuclear weapons “have been identified and destroyed” (Porter 1996, 7). However, many weapons and their components are still unaccounted for. Iraqi officials claim that Iraq destroyed the unaccounted weapons during the summer following the Gulf War. The United States, however, is hesitant to believe this account. Rolf Ekeus, Chairman of the Commission, stated that “[the Commission]’s concern is that Iraq has made additional scuds indigenously using bits and pieces, spare parts, from the imported stocks” (Porter 1996, 7). The United States made it clear that it would not approve the Security Council lifting of the current sanctions until the Commission was absolutely sure about Iraq’s nuclear program’s dismantlement. This situation remained unresolved until May of 1998.

On April 17, 1998 a UN report from the chief United Nations arms inspector in Iraq concluded that Iraq was no closer to meeting the requirements set for lifting sanctions than it had been the previous fall (Crossette 1998a, A1). This report, as it had twice in the past, almost drove the United States into military intervention. However, rather than pursue that route the United States chose to hold off until a complete inspection report of approval had been made. Two days after the report was issued the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the group responsible for the verification of Iraqi compliance, said “it was moving closer to declaring Iraq nuclear [weapons] free” (Crossette 1998b, A4). This statement was taken with much reservation from American nuclear scientists. Many of the scientists believe that nuclear materials may still be hidden in presidential sites, those sites designated in conjunction with the cease-fire, that are off-limits to United Nations inspectors in Iraq. Moreover, if any spare parts exist it would be extremely easy for the Iraqis to reconstructure the bomb given the advanced technology they now possess.

However, these reservations were overcome two weeks later on May 9 when the UN, upon recommendation of the IAEA, lifted the sanctions against Iraqi oil exports without United States reservation (Crossette 1998c, A5). The United
States in turn began to press for a more intense continued verification system, in order to ensure that Iraq does not recommence its nuclear program. This issue was brought to resolution on May 15 when the Security Council agreed to scale back its nuclear inspections in Iraq after an assessment of Iraq’s present nuclear capability could be made (Associated Press 1998, A12).

The United States played a primary role in the multilateral decision to reassess Iraqi capability, and negotiated for an open-ended review period in which Iraq could be checked upon. Though the United States often supports a position of force it will be looking forward to a more compromise-based, incentive-driven program of diplomacy. With Iraq’s current military forces in decline, the United States will be evaluating the possibility of lifting its own individual sanctions in return for full Iraqi compliance with Security Council Resolution 687 (O’Hanlon 1999b). Security Council Resolution 687 strongly recommends “eliminating [Iraqi] weapons of mass destruction while also accounting for Kuwaiti citizens kidnapped or killed by Iraqi forces,” during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. All of these steps were necessary United States foreign policy objectives (O’Hanlon 1999b).

**FOREIGN POLICY SCENARIO II: THE NUCLEAR SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA**

I want to make it very, very clear that I am deeply disturbed by the nuclear tests which India has conducted, and I do not believe it contributes to building a safer 21st century. The United States strongly opposes any new nuclear testing. This action by India not only threatens the stability of the region, it directly challenges the international consensus to stop the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. I call on India to announce that it will conduct no further tests, and that it will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now and without conditions. I also urge India’s neighbors not to follow suit — not to follow down the path of a dangerous arms race. As most of you know, our laws have very stringent provisions. …And I intend to implement them fully (Clinton 1998, May 12).

Currently, the issue of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear testing and possible nuclear arms race is one of the most pressing on the United States foreign policy agenda. During 1998 the situation escalated from a twenty-year standoff to a nuclear dilemma. On May 12, 1998 India conducted three nuclear tests, defying an unwritten two-year long moratorium (Burns 1998a, A1). The United States immediately reacted under the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, 22 United States Code Section 6301, “a Federal law which [ordered] President Clinton to impose severe penalties on nations conducting nuclear testing,” by considering cutting off all U.S. government aid and blocking both International Monetary Fund (IMF) funding and World Bank loans (Weiner 1998a, A1). Currently India receives $40 billion in cumulative aid from United Nations organs and individual states per year and was expecting an additional $3 billion in 1998. As a whole the United States’ levying of sanctions could cost India over $4.5 billion in 1998 alone (Weiner 1998a, A1). In addition to the United States’ possible levying of sanctions against India, the United States also immediately contacted Pakistan asking that it not retaliate and detonate nuclear bombs of its own.

On 13 May, 1998 President Clinton offered India immunity from sanctions on the condition that it would become a signatory to the CTBT (Myers 1998, A1). India refused; however it reaffirmed its overall commitment to disarmament in a letter to the President. It also expressed interest in negotiating the following spring at the 1999 Conference on Disarmament where those issues could be openly debated and brought to resolution (New York Times 1998a, A14). The United States responded by holding true to its promise to levy sanctions and bar investments. However, realizing the path which a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent could take, President Clinton continued to communicate with Pakistan.

On 14 May, 1998 United States satellites revealed that Pakistan was preparing for a nuclear test. In response President Clinton sent advisors to Pakistan in order to quell that country’s need to test (Weiner 1998b, A1). Moreover on 15 May, President Clinton informed Pakistan that it would be well rewarded if it did not “bend to the pressures of competition” (Kinzer 1998a, A10). In addition, two days later Samuel R. Berger, the U.S. President’s National Security Adviser, offered to review the pending delivery of the 28 F-16s to Pakistan that were paid for nearly a decade ago (Bennet 1998, A16).

Another foreign policy approach the United States attempted was a bilateral one. On 18 May President Clinton began pressing President Yeltsin to ratify the CTBT, START II and other international disarmament treaties in hopes that such action would influence Pakistan, as a Russian ally, not to test. Sadly, however, Yeltsin’s opposition in the Lower House of the Russian Parliament postponed debate on the START II treaty as well as the CTBT until September (Reuters 1998, A12). While Clinton was communicating with Yeltsin India detonated a hydrogen bomb, commonly known in military circles as a city buster. This detonation was proof that not only did India have nuclear technology, but also had advanced technology capable of destroying entire large-city populations (Burns 1998a, A1). The United States continued to press the world community for sanctions and other condemnations, but few nations, save Japan and Germany, were responsive.

Following multiple phone calls from President Clinton, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan announced that Pakistan, “for the past twenty years has been a responsible state;” however, the sanctions currently placed on India do not make the nuclear threat any less (Kinzer 1998b, A9). He also stated that he thought that Pakistan had waited patiently by while the world attempted to negotiate an end to India’s nuclear testing, but under the current conditions no progress had been visibly made (Kinzer 1998b, A9). On 28 May, 1998,
to the dismay of the world community, Pakistan detonated three nuclear devices in order to answer India’s detonations just two weeks before (New York Times 1998b, A20). President Clinton condemned the tests as “contributing to a self-defeating cycle of escalation.” He also levied similar sanctions on Pakistan for “[undermining] the global consensus on nonproliferation” (Weiner 1998c, A8). However, the United States’ efforts to sanction the two new nuclear states were constrained. President Clinton stated that, “‘There’s nothing I can do’” (Weiner 1998c, A8). President Clinton again condemned Pakistan’s decision to conduct a second round of nuclear tests on 30 May, 1998. As a consequence of Pakistan’s action President Clinton determined that according to the Arms Export Control Act any necessary actions for sanction imposition should be taken (Clinton 1999, 2). Current U.S. foreign policy towards the two nations will continue to be one of strict penalties; however, it will also include room for negotiation.

On 1 June 1998 India proposed a “new global treaty limiting nuclear arsenals that would include all nuclear weapons states” (Burns 1998c, A1). Though vehemently opposed to such a treaty in the past the United States is now sincerely considering such a negotiation. The United States in turn pursued a multilateral resolution to the situations, its only remaining foreign policy option. On 30 November, 1998 both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and India’s Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee spoke to the UN General Assembly regarding their intent to become party to the CTBT. This would be a major step toward the accomplishment of United States policy objectives. However, multiple contentions were stipulated by both states. They are looking to become party to the treaty if and only if the United States along with the other five nuclear states also begin to dismantle their armaments. This contingency is supported by the United States; however, it is necessary that all nuclear weapons states also agree to this compromise (Moore 1998, 2). Even if this treaty is viable in the near future the largest concern remains. Stated a White House senior official, “We’re still worried about a missile test by Pakistan and an Indian response. The best that could be hoped for in the short-run was that India and Pakistan would be as careful with their nuclear weapons and policies as Washington and Moscow were during the cold war” (Weiner 1998c, A8).

**CURRENT AND FUTURE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES**

There is a growing realization of the futility of war, and a general tendency to avoid military conflict. Even so, there is still much to be done to make this an accepted part of our culture. We have to eradicate the pernicious notion that war is a natural phenomenon, that man is biologically programmed for aggression. There is no scientific evidence for this thesis. In this nuclear age we can no longer base our policies on the old Roman dictum. This must be replaced by: Si vis pacem para pacem, if you want peace, prepare for peace. We have to educate ourselves to become conscious of our belonging to the human species; we have to develop a loyalty to humankind. Every educational process is very slow, and we have a long way to go before war is eliminated. But we will never reach the objective unless we make a start. A good start to this long-term objective is the short-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. Let us therefore devote ourselves to this important task (Rotblat 1996, 8).

United States foreign policy regarding disarmament in the future will be one that will follow along the lines of established disarmament beliefs: overall nuclear disarmament through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral means. The United States will continue to press for the disarmament of itself and all nuclear states, providing that national security can still be maintained while lessening the strong hold of the nuclear era. Recently the United States has been engaged in the development of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START III), the third in a series of treaties designed to eliminate the nuclear armament of the United States and Russia. This treaty, as proposed, does however, require the entrance of other parties into its agreement. This is important because if the United States continues to disarm without the other nuclear states or possible nuclear states, then the United States will lose its relative power in the international system. This is of paramount importance to the continuance of the United States’ place in the international system.

The proposed element of START III is the dismantlement of nuclear stockpiles of up to 2,000-2,500 warheads (Milne 1998, A6). This is important because this would decrease the nuclear armaments of the United States nuclear arsenal by 20 percent. The United States is still hesitant to propose a measure this drastic without the cooperation of other nuclear states. Currently, the United States is negotiating with Britain in order to add it to the disarmament required by START III; however due to the relatively small number of British armaments these negotiations are very fragile. Along with Britain the United States is looking to include all other nuclear states in the disarmament process.

One of the largest problems facing the United States, as well as all states that are attempting to disarm, is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in rogue states (states not designated as nuclear states), namely in light of the current situation, India and Pakistan. These are nations that are not governed by the NPT or any other treaty; they are only in violation of the moral paradigms put in place by the end of the cold war. There is no leverage against newcomer nuclear powers. . . . This is why the super powers are still a long way from being able to make any impact on their greatest worry, the danger of further nuclear proliferation. Is not the best way of tackling the threat of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction to “create a climate of disarmament”? (Power 1998, B10).

The U.S. answer to that question is that the climate must be created while maintaining the United States’ power. Moreover, the United States has been engaged in the dilemma of how to disarm its current weapons under START
II. In 1997 protocols were devised between Boris Yeltsin and President Clinton that would lengthen the current disarmament for another five years. Under this all delivery vehicles would be eliminated by 2003 and their respective warheads removed by 2007 (Norris 1999, 78). Though feasible this undertaking is one of unequivocal financial allocation. In order to disarm that many war heads it will cost over $24 billion just to initiate the process. While the United States is completely willing to make such a financial commitment, it is necessary for other states to participate in the disarmament process for these strategies to take place.

The United States, due to the current unwillingness of other states to disarm, has begun to upgrade its current nuclear arsenal. It planned to spend $27 billion throughout the 1999 fiscal year on reoutfitting Poseidon submarines with more compact warheads, so delivery is more precise and efficient (Norris 1999, 83). Though this action may seem to violate its policy of disarmament, it is important to remember that the United States’ primary objective is to maintain its power while disarming. The United States only continues this program to solidify its own power until a sound disarmament agreement can be reached.

In addition to the above disarmament measures START III will also include the withdrawal of 1,000-1,500 strategic warheads from operational systems. Those weapons will then be placed in a reserve category, and then designated as a warhead unit to be destroyed (Norris 1999, 79). This consolidation of weapons systems will soon be followed by more of the same if other countries comply with disarmament measures.

All of these nuclear measures are goals of the United States for future disarmament. Unfortunately, due to the complex nature of the variables involved this process can be extremely time consuming. In the United States it is the various constituency groups and the military who slow the process. For example, the START II treaty was held up by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) for a number of years and “for some START III may have [its own] comatose period” (Arkin 1999, 82). The average time frame for disarmament legislation to pass and be ratified has been so lengthy in the past that the START treaties “no longer promote long-term strategic stability nor provide a sensible day-to-day nuclear posture” (Arkin 1999, 81). Though these disarmament goals are feasible other measures must be evaluated as options for future disarmament.

There are three nuclear disarmament foreign policies that the author sees as feasible for the United States in the future. First, the percentage model; second, the proliferation model; and third, the full disarmament model. All of these models are theoretical predictions on my part for the future of disarmament.

The percentage model is a reduction theory staged on equal percentage disarmament in all nuclear states. For example, under this model all nuclear states would be party to this agreement and a percentage reduction in their nuclear stockpiles would be agreed upon. This is an equitable solution to the most primary fears of disarmament to all nuclear states: the maintenance of relative power. Under this model relative power would be upheld during the disarming because all nations would be disarming. However, this model is contingent on two points: The first is verification measures. All states party to the treaty must be willing to allow for stringent verification measures. And second, since the states that possess less nuclear weapons would not be able to dismantle fractions of a nuclear warhead, such states would have to dismantle only when a full fraction of the nations with larger nuclear arsenals disarmed. For example, if the United States were required to disarm 20 percent of its arsenal, but India only possessed four nuclear weapons, then the latter would not be required to disarm at all until the next percentage agreement. This model would serve to facilitate the disarmament process while providing relative security to all states. The primary drawback of this method, is that it does not incorporate a system by which to curb other nations who do not incorporate a system by which to curb other nations who do not currently possess nuclear weapons, from acquiring them.

The proliferation model means unfortunately, with the detonation of nuclear weapons in both Pakistan and India, the increased spread of nuclear armaments among nations. Though pessimistic, this view has become more realistic given the possibility of officially non-nuclear states becoming nuclear. The United States has an obligation to its people to further its national security. Its options will continue to be those of diplomacy upon the verification that a state is building nuclear weapons. However if such diplomatic policy options are ineffective then force will be asserted. And lastly if none of those policy options are well received and solvent then new nuclear arms race will be engaged in. For the United States this system is actually very cost effective. It will no longer have to pay to dismantle any of its warheads and it can pace itself to slowly increase its relative power. But, however effective this system may be, it is the most dangerous policy option the world has. It will be the responsibility of the United States to stop this model through conventional means before it becomes a reality.

The full disarmament model is, of course, the most optimistic. This model is the current goal of the United States but it is also the least feasible, at least in the short run. This model assumes that all nuclear states will become party to START III and begin to disarm. Though this model aims toward complete disarmament it is also contingent on strong verification measures, and most importantly continued non-nuclear status for all other states. It would be disastrous for every nuclear state to disarm while a non-nuclear state acquires nuclear weapons. In essence this would be the destruction of every nuclear state's relative capability and would thus leave them as weaker states. This is not an option for the United States. It must strive to keep up its position in the international system. As such it will only continue, while disarming, to encourage and in some cases enforce the non-proliferation policies of other nations.

I contend that the most feasible of the models is the percentage model with reservation. Reservation is necessary due to the need for verification measures and the monitoring of
non-nuclear states. If these two goals can be accomplished then nuclear disarmament will continue.

In the future the United States will work toward a new disarmament order, one that promotes safety in the international system, and strives to maintain the current balance of power that multipolarity has infused into the international system. In doing so it may deviate slightly from its current hard-line stance towards nuclear situations, into one that is more diplomatic towards the states that are attempting to comply with current and future disarmament agreements.

Foreign policy as a whole towards disarmament has changed dynamically throughout the years. It has evolved from the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, to the cessation of testing, and finally to their gradual dismantlement. As the United States ushers in the new millennium as the premier superpower, it takes with it the obligation to guarantee national and international security. It is the responsibility of the United States to strive to stop the spread of regional conflict and war in general. Moreover, the United States must watch over and contemplate the possibility of another arms race, because no matter how conscious the international system is of the potential for conflict, the hazard always exists that situations like the one in south Asia may become reality. These situations have caused, and always will cause nuclear disarmament to “remain a major theme of foreign policy and national security strategy” (Lehman 1996, viii).

REFERENCES


